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CRIMINAL LAW - CONSPIRACY - RULE OF CONSPIRA-
TORIAL CONSISTENCY NOT APPLICABLE TO VERDICTS
RENDERED IN SEPARATE TRIALS. GARDNER v. STATE,
286 Md. 520, 408 A.2d 1317 (1979).
I. INTRODUCTION
It is well settled that the perpetration of a criminal conspiracy
requires the participation of at least two persons.' Therefore, a de-
fendant may not be convicted of conspiracy when all of his alleged
co-conspirators have been acquitted.2 This principle, known as the
rule of conspiratorial consistency,3 has long been recognized in Mary-
land.4 Recently, however, the Court of Appeals of Maryland, in Gard-
ner v. State, 5 affirmed the conspiracy conviction of a criminal defend-
ant whose sole alleged co-conspirator had been acquitted in a sepa-
rate trial. The court held that verdicts rendered against co-conspira-
tors need not be consistent when each defendant is tried separately.6
In so holding, the court limited the application of the consistency
rule to verdicts delivered in a joint trial.
This casenote reviews the development of the consistency rule
and the underlying principles upon which the rule is based. In addi-
tion, the validity and implications of Gardner are examined, with
particular emphasis on whether collateral estoppel will bar the prose-
cution of an alleged conspirator whose sole alleged co-conspirator
has been previously acquitted.
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
On April 29, 1977, Roger Gardner and Ralph Lubow were
arrested and charged with two counts of conspiring to commit
murder. 7 Gardner requested a separate trials and was tried without a
jury several months before Lubow.9 Claiming that Lubow was
1. E.g., De Camp v. United States, 10 F.2d 984, 985 (D.C. Cir. 1926); Bloomer v. State, 48
Md. 521, 536 (1878); People v. Heidt, 312 Mich. 629, 642, 20 N.W.2d 751, 756 (1945); W.
CLARK & W. MARSHALL, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CRIMES § 9.00, at 489 (6th ed. 1952)
[hereinafter cited as CLARK & MARSHALL].
2. E.g., Hurwitz v. State, 200 Md. 578, 592, 92 A.2d 575, 581 (1952); CLARK & MARSHALL,
supra note 1, § 9.07 at 519; L. HOCHHEIMER, THE LAW OF CRIMES AND CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE § 290, at 323 (2d ed. 1904).
3. Gardner v. State, 286 Md. 520, 524, 408 A.2d 1317, 1319 (1979).
4. See Bloomer v. State, 48 Md. 521, 536 (1878).
5. 286 Md. 520, 408 A.2d 1317 (1979).
6. Id at 528, 408 A.2d at 1322.
7. Brief for Appellant at 1, Gardner v. State, 286 Md. 520, 408 A.2d 1317 (1979). Gardner
and Lubow were also charged with a handgun violation and two counts of solicitation to
commit murder. Brief for Appellee at 1, Gardner v. State, 41 Md. App. 187, 396 A.2d 303
(1979).
8. A separate trial is permitted in Maryland under rule 745. MD. R.P. 745.
9. 286 Md. 520, 522, 408 A.2d 1317, 1319 (1979).
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legally insane at the time of the alleged agreement to conspire, Gard-
ner asserted as his primary defense that there could be no conspiracy
because Lubow's insanity negated the existence of the requisite joint
criminal intent.10 The trial court rejected this argument, specifically
finding Lubow competent at the time of the agreement." Gardner
was found guilty on both counts of conspiracy 12 and appealed his
conviction to the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland. 3
While Gardner's appeal was pending, Lubow was tried before a
jury and found not guilty by reason of insanity.1 4 When Gardner
appeared before the court of special appeals, he urged the court to
apply the consistency rule and reverse his conviction in light of
Lubow's acquittal. 5 The court of special appeals affirmed the judg-
ment of the trial court, holding that the disposition of Lubow's case
did not affect the validity of Gardner's conviction.1 6 Gardner
appealed to the Court of Appeals of Maryland, which affirmed the
decision below.
17
III. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF CONSPIRACY
According to most legal scholars, conspiracy was first pro-
scribed as criminal in a fourteenth century English statute.18 Under
10. Gardner v. State, 41 Md. App. 187, 191, 396 A.2d 303, 306, affd, 286 Md. 520, 408 A.2d
1317 (1979). The defense relied primarily upon the decision of the Court of Special Appeals
of Maryland in Regle v. State, 9 Md. App. 346, 264 A.2d 119 (1970). In Regle, the court
held that "where only two persons are implicated in a conspiracy, and one is shown to
have been insane at the time the agreement was concluded, and hence totally incapable of
committing any crime, there is no punishable criminal conspiracy, the requisite joint
criminal intent being absent." Id at 355, 264 A.2d at 124.
11. 286 Md. 520, 522, 408 A.2d 1317, 1319 (1979). The court of appeals quoted the trial judge
as stating:
I find that the State has met its burden and has established beyond a reasonable
doubt that Mr. Lubow ... , although he suffered from a mental disorder... [did]
have substantial capacity to appreciate the criminality of his conduct during the
period in question and he did have substantial capacity to conform his conduct
to the requirements of the law during that period and, therefore, I rule in the
legal sense that he was not insane during that period and that, therefore, the
conspiracy was formed.
Id at 528-29, 408 A.2d at 1319.
12. In addition, the trial judge found Gardner guilty of solicitation to commit murder. Gard-
ner was sentenced to a term of five years imprisonment. Id at 522, 408 A.2d at 1319.
13. Gardner v. State, 41 Md. App. 187, 396 A.2d 303, affd, 286 Md. 520, 408 A.2d 1317
(1979). "
14. Gardner v. State, 286 Md. 520, 523, 408 A.2d 1317, 1319 (1979).
15. Brief for Appellant at 16-19, Gardner v. State, 41 Md. App. 187, 396 A.2d 303 (1979).
Gardner also argued that his conviction of solicitation to commit murder was not
supported by sufficient evidence. The court rejected this argument and affirmed his con-
viction. 41 Md. App. 187, 200-01, 396 A.2d 303, 311, af/, 286 Md. 520, 408 A.2d 1317
(1979).
16. 41 Md. App. 187, 198, 396 A.2d 303, 310, affd, 286 Md 520, 408 A.2d 1317 (1979).
17. Gardner v. State, 286 Md. 520, 408 A.2d 1317 (1979).
18. See 8 W. HOLDSwORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 378-79 (1966); 2 J. STEPHEN,
HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 228 (1882); Arens, Conspiracy Revisited, 3
BUFFALO L. REV. 242, 243-44 (1954); Blair, The Judge-Made Law of Conspiracy, 37 Am.
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this statute,19 conspiracy was narrowly defined as the malicious pro-
curement of a false indictment. This offense, which frustrated the
administration of justice, was punishable only after the person false-
ly accused had been acquitted.20
It was not until the Poulterer's Case,2" decided by an English
court in 1611, that the mere agreement to accuse falsely was
declared a substantive offense, punishable even if the victim had not
been indicted. 22 Eventually, the crime of conspiracy was further ex-
panded to encompass not only agreements to accuse falsely, but also
agreements to commit any wrongful act.23 This broadened definition
of conspiracy was ultimately adopted in the United States.
Presently, criminal conspiracy is defined as a combination of two
or more persons to accomplish a criminal or unlawful act, or to do a
lawful act by criminal or unlawful means. 24 Because the gravamen of
L. REV. 33 (1903); Harno, Intent in Criminal Conspiracy, 89 U. PA. L. REV. 624, 624-25
(1941); Pollack, Common Law Conspiracy, 35 GEO. L.J. 328, 339-40 (1947) [hereinafter
cited as Pollack]; Sayre, Criminal Conspiracy, 35 HARV. L. REV. 393, 395 (1922)
[hereinafter cited as Sayre]; Developments in the Law-Criminal Conspiracy, 72 HARV. L.
REV. 920, 922-23 (1959) [hereinafter cited as Developments].
It should be noted that some early American judges concluded that conspiracy was a
common law offense independent of the early English statute. E.g., State v. Buchanan, 5
H. & J. 317, 344 (Md. 1821); accord, Commonwealth v. Donohue, 250 Ky. 343,63 S.W.2d 3
(1933); State v. Green, 344 Mo. 985, 130 S.W.2d 475 (1939); 2 J. BISHOP, NEW CRIMINAL
LAW § 176 (1882). For a refutation of this view, see Blair, The Judge-Made Law of
Conspiracy, supra, at 47-51.
19. Ordinance of Conspirators, 1305, 33 Edw. I. The statute provided in pertinent part:
Conspirators be they that do confeder or bind themselves by oath, covenant, or
other alliance, that every one of them shall aid and bear the other falsely and
maliciously to indite, or cause to indite, or falsely to move or maintain pleas; and
also such as cause children within age to appeal men of felony whereby they are
imprisoned and sore grieved; and such as retain men in the country with liveries
or fees for to maintain their malicious enterprises; and this extendeth as well to
the takers, as to the givers; and stewards and bailiffs of great lords, which by
their seignory, office, or power, undertake to bear or maintain quarrels, pleas, or
debates, that concern other parties than such as touch the estates of their lords
or themselves.
Id
20. Harno, Intent in Criminal Conspiracy, 89 U. PA. L. REV. 624, 625 (1941); Sayre, supra note
18, at 397.
21. 77 Eng. Rep. 813 (Star Ch. 1611).
22. In the Poulterer's Case, several poulterers agreed to falsely charge Stone with robbery,
but no indictment was returned by the grand jury. Suit was brought against the
poulterers for conspiracy. As a defense, the defendant poulterers argued that because
Stone had never been indicted, they could not be found guilty of conspiracy. Id The Star
Chamber rejected this argument and held that the confederation, rather than the false
indictment and subsequent acquittal, constituted the offense, Id at 814.
Commentators have suggested that the modern development of conspiracy stems
entirely from the decision of the Star Chamber in the Poulterer's Case. See Harno, Intent
in Criminal Conspiracy, 89 U. PA. L. REV. 624, 625 (1941); Pollack, supra note 18, at 342.
See also 8 W. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 378 (1966).
23. 8 W. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 379 (1966).
24. E.g., Regle v. State, 9 Md. App. 346,350, 264 A.2d 119, 122 (1970); State v. Littlejohn, 264
N.C. 571, 574, 142 S.E.2d 132, 134 (1965); State v. Smith, 197 Tenn. 350, 354, 273 S.W.2d
143, 145-46 (1954); CLARK & MARSHALL, supra note 1, § 9.00 at 489; J. MILLER, HAND-
BOOK OF CRIMINAL LAW 108 (1934). Although this definition is generally given, many
courts and text writers ha. e suggested that it is impossible to confine conspiracy within
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conspiracy is the unlawful agreement 5 between two or more persons,
the crime may not be committed by one person acting alone.2" From
this general principle arose the rule of conspiratorial consistency: a
defendant may not be convicted of conspiracy when all of his alleged
co-conspirators have been acquitted.27
the boundaries of a definitive statement. See Smith v. People, 25 11. 17, 23 (1860). In
Commonwealth v. Donohue, 250 Ky. 343, 63 S.W.2d 3 (1933), the court noted that "[tihe
comprehensiveness and indefiniteness of the offense of conspiracy has made an exact
definition a very difficult one.... Id at 347, 63 S.W.2d at 5. See generally Pollack, supra
note 18, at 329-38; 18 TEMP. U. L.Q. 268, 269 (1943).
25. "[I]t is the overt act of combining-confederating minds that forms the hard core of
conspiracy rather than acts done in furtherance of the . . . agreement." CLARK &
MARSHALL, supra note 1, § 9.00 at 489-90; accord, Marshall v. People, 160 Colo. 323, 328,
417 P.2d 491, 494 (1966); Smith v. State, 241 Ind. 311, 317-18, 170 N.E.2d 794, 798
(1960); Greenwald v. State, 221 Md. 245, 250, 157 A.2d 119, 122, cert denied, 363 U.S. 719
(1960); State v. Carbone, 10 N.J. 329, 337, 91 A.2d 571, 574 (1952). But cf Cave v. United
States, 390 F.2d 58, 69 (8th Cir.) (conspiracy requires an agreement attended by an overt
act toward effecting the object of the agreement), cert denied, 392 U.S. 906 (1968).
26. "The impossibility of one person forming a combination with himself is too obvious for
discussion .... R. PERKINS, CRIMINAL LAW 622 (2d ed. 1969). But see MODEL PENAL CODE
§ 5.03 (1962). The Model Penal Code departs from the traditional requirement that the
guilt of at least two persons must be established. In § 5.03, the Code defines conspiracy in
terms of a person agreeing with another, as opposed to an agreement between two or
more persons. By emphasizing individual, rather than group liability, the guilt of each
conspirator is made independent of that of his co-conspirators. MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.03,
Comment (Tent. Draft No. 10, 1960).
27. E.g., Gardner v. State, 286 Md. 520, 524, 408 A.2d 1317, 1319 (1979); Hurwitz v. State,
200 Md. 578, 592, 92 A.2d 575, 581 (1952). The rationale underlying the consistency rule
was well stated by the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland in Regle v. State, 9 Md. App.
346, 264 A.2d 119 (1970):
That it is illogical to acquit all but one of a purported partnership in crime; that
acquittal of all persons with whom a defendant is alleged to have conspired is
repugnant to the existence of the requisite corrupt agreement; and that regard-
less of the criminal animus of the defendant, there must be someone with whom
he confected his corrupt agreement and where all his alleged co-conspirators are
not guilty, a like finding as to him must be made.
Id at 351-52, 264 A.2d at 122.
The consistency rule is inapplicable when the disposition of the co-conspirator's case
amounts to less than an acquittal. See, e.g., United States v. Monroe, 164 F.2d 471 (2d Cir.
1947) (unindicted), cert denied, 333 U.S. 828 (1948); Farnsworth v. Zerbst, 98 F.2d 541.
(5th Cir. 1938) (immune from prosecution); Rosenthal v. United States, 45 F.2d 1000 (8th
Cir. 1930) (unapprehended); People v. Nall, 242 Ill. 284, 89 N.E. 1012 (1909) (dead); Adams
v. State, 202 Md. 455, 97 A.2d 281 (1953) (unknown), rev'd on other grounds, 347 U.S. 179
(1954); Hurwitz v. State, 200 Md. 578, 92 A.2d 575 (1952) (immune from prosecution);
Commonwealth v. MacKenzie, 211 Mass. 578, 98 N.E. 598 (1912) (unapprehended); State
v. Davenport, 227 N.C. 475, 42 S.E.2d 686 (1947) (dead); 33 TUL. L. REV. 393 (1959). See
generally Developments, supra note 18, at 972. The jurisdictions are split on whether a
conspirator may be convicted when the only other alleged co-conspirator has been granted
a nolle prosequi. Compare United States v. Fox, 130 F.2d 56 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 317
U.S. 666 (1942); United States v. Lieberman, 8 F.2d 318 (E.D.N.Y. 1925); People v.
Bryant, 409 111.467, 100 N.E.2d 598 (1951); La Fortez v. State, 11 Md. App. 598, 275 A.2d
526 (1971); and State v. Lloyd, 152 Wis. 24, 139 N.W. 514 (1913) with United States v.
Shipp, 359 F.2d 185 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 903 (1966); Feder v. United States,
257 F. 694 (2d Cir. 1919); and State v. Jackson, 7 S.C. 283 (1876). See generally 15 DET.
L.J. 148 (1952); 18 TEMP. U. L.Q. 268 (1943); 1967 UTAH L. REV. 322.
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The vast majority of jurisdictions apply the consistency rule
when all participants of an alleged conspiracy are tried together.2 8
There is a division between the jurisdictions, however, as to whether
the rule applies when the alleged conspirators are tried separately.2 9
In State v. Tom,30 the earliest American case addressing the issue,
the Supreme Court of North Carolina held that the rule of conspira-
torial consistency applied with equal force to verdicts in separate
trials. 1 The court stated that "the operation on one [conspirator] of
the acquittal of the other does not arise from the mode of pronounc-
ing it, but from the fact of the acquittal itself being in due course of
law, [and] the guilt of one being dependent upon the other. '32
The majority of the jurisdictions that have commented on the
issue have approved of the rule enunciated in State v. Tom 3 Re-
cently, however, a growing number of jurisdictions have expressed
approval of the minority view, which does not require consistent ver-
dicts in separate trials. 4 This view was first delineated by the
Nebraska Supreme Court in Platt v. State.3 5
28. See, e.g., Bartkus v. United States, 21 F.2d 425 (7th Cir. 1927); VanTress v. United States.
292 F. 513 (6th Cir. 1923); Kirkwood v. United States, 256 F. 825 (8th Cir. 1919); People
v. MacMullen, 134 Cal. App. 81, 24 P.2d 794 (1933); Archuleta v. People, 149 Colo. 206,
368 P.2d 422 (1962); People v. Regan, 351 Ill. App. 550, 115 N.E.2d 817 (1953); State v.
Raper, 204 N.C. 503, 168 S.E. 831 (1933).
29. Compare State v. Tom, 13 N.C. (2 Dev.) 371 (1830) with Platt v. State, 143 Neb. 131, 8
N.W.2d 849 (1943).
30. 13 N.C. (2 Dev.) 371 (1830).
31. Id at 377.
32. Id
33. See, e.g., Romontio v. United States, 400 F.2d 618, 619 (10th Cir. 1968), cert dismissed,
402 U.S. 903 (1970); Miller v. United States, 277 F. 721, 726 (4th Cir. 1921); United States
v. Bruno, 333 F. Supp. 570, 577 (E.D. Pa. 1971); Pearce v. State, 330 So. 2d 783, 784 (Fla.
App.), cert denied, 341 So. 2d 293 (Fla. 1976); People v. Levy, 299 Ill. App. 453, 458-59,
20 N.E.2d 171, 173 (1939); Casper v. State, 47 Wis. 535, 544, 2 N.W. 1117, 1119 (1879);
accord, Eyman v. Deutsch, 92 Ariz. 82, 373 P.2d 716 (1962), noted in 36 TEMP. L.Q. 360
(1963); 24 U. Pirr. L. REV. 647 (1963).
In Casper v. State, 47 Wis. 535, 2 N.W. 1117 (1879), the court set forth the justifica-
tion for the majority position as follows:
fWihere several are prosecuted together, taken, and may be brought to trial, for
conspiracy, and, their trial being severed, one only has been tried and found
guilty, there is manifest impropriety in proceeding to judgment against him
before the trial of his co-defendants. The verdict against him would raise no
presumption against them, and their acquittal would be inconsistent with his
conviction, and should operate in law to acquit him also. Judgment against him,
in such case, would not only be a cruel injustice, but an absurdity, which the law
ought not to sanction, for one only cannot be guilty of conspiracy, and judgment
against one, upon acquittal of those charged with him, would be not only a
wrong to the person, but a blunder in the law.
Id at 544, 2 N.W. at 1119.
34. See, e.g., United States v. Espinosa-Cerpa, 630 F.2d 328 (5th Cir. 1980); Rosencrans v.
United States, 378 F.2d 561 (5th Cir. 1967); People v. Holzer, 25 CaL App. 3d 456,460, 102
CaL Rptr. 11, 13 (1972); State v. Oats, 32 N.J. Super. 435, 108 A.2d 641 (1954); People v.
Berkowitz, 50 N.Y.2d 333, 406 N.E.2d 783, 428 N.Y.S.2d 927 (1980). See generally
Marcus, Conspiracy: The Criminal Agreement in Theory and in Practice, 65 GEO. L.J. 925,
957-58 (1977); Developments, supra note 18, at 972.
35. 143 Neb. 131, 8 N.W.2d 849 (1943), noted in 27 NEB. L. REV. 443 (1948).
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Prior to Gardner v. State,36 the Court of Appeals of Maryland
had never directly addressed the issue of whether the rule of con-
spiratorial consistency should be applied to separate trials.37 The
early Maryland case of Bloomer v. State,3" however, appears to
recognize the applicability of the consistency rule to separate trials.
In Bloomer, the defendant offered into evidence the record of his
alleged co-conspirator's acquittal by a New Jersey court.39 The
Bloomer court noted that when only two persons are charged with
conspiracy, the acquittal of one mandates the acquittal of the other. °
The court qualified this statement, however, by holding that the ac-
quittal of the one conspirator must be by a court of competent
jurisdiction in the same state in which the prosecution of the other is
pending.41 Because the co-conspirator's acquittal was by a New
Jersey court, the Bloomer court concluded that the acquittal did not
bar the defendant's prosecution in Maryland. 42 To the extent that it
implied that the rule of consistency was applicable to verdicts
rendered in separate trials, the dicta in Bloomer was expressly dis-
approved of by the court in Gardner.3
IV. THE COURT'S OPINION
In Gardner v. State,4 4 the primary issue before the court of ap-
peals was whether one conspirator's conviction may stand when the
sole alleged co-conspirator is acquitted at a subsequent trial.45 Rely-
ing on the rule of conspiratorial consistency, the defendant argued
that his conviction was inconsistent with the acquittal of Lubow, his
sole alleged co-conspirator, and should therefore be reversed.46 The
state argued that the consistency rule should not be applied to
separate trials. Alternatively, the state contended that Lubow's
acquittal by reason of insanity did not necessarily negate the ex-
istence of an illegal meeting of the minds. The court of appeals
adopted the state's first argument and affirmed Gardner's convic-
tion. The second argument presented by the state was not
addressed.
In refusing to apply the consistency rule to separate trials, the
court relied primarily upon the Nebraska Supreme Court's decision
in Platt v. State.47 Adopting the rationale in Platt, the Gardner court
36. 286 Md. 520, 408 A.2d 1317 (1979).
37. Id at 525, 408 A.2d at 1320.
38. 48 Md. 521 (1878).
39. Id at 535-36.
40. Id at 536.
41. Id
42. Id
43. 286 Md. 520, 528, 408 A.2d 1317, 1321 (1979).
44. 286 Md. 520, 408 A.2d 1317 (1979).
45. Id at 522, 408 A.2d at 1319.
46. Id at 523, 408 A.2d at 1319.
47. 143 Neb. 131, 8 N.W.2d 849 (1943).
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stated that a guilty verdict rendered in the trial of one conspirator
also concludes the guilt of the other conspirator for purposes of that
trial.48 Once the guilt of the untried co-conspirator is found against
the convicted defendant, the required elements of conspiracy are
established. Therefore, the conviction is proper, and its validity is
not affected by the acquittal of the co-conspirator in a later trial.4 9
Based upon this reasoning, the Gardner court held that verdicts
rendered in separate trials need not be consistent, but that the
evidence adduced at each trial must be sufficient in itself to support
the verdict rendered.5" Concluding that the evidence presented at
Gardner's trial supported the finding that Gardner and Lubow con-
spired, the court of appeals upheld the conviction."
V. ANALYSIS
A. The Rule of Conspiratorial Consistency
Application of the conspiratorial consistency rule is legally im-
perative in the context of a joint trial. When both participants in an
alleged conspiracy are tried together, a failure of proof as to one
necessarily amounts to a failure of proof as to both.52 If one alleged
conspirator is convicted and the other is acquitted, the court is faced
with two conflicting factual determinations based on the same pre-
sentation of evidence.53 Although the conviction of one indicates a
finding that both conspired, the acquittal of the other denies that
determination. Because the law requires verdicts to be inherently
consistent,54 the guilty verdict should not be permitted to stand.
As the Gardner court judiciously concluded, the rationale of the
consistency rule does not apply when the alleged conspirators are
tried separately.5 A guilty verdict rendered at the trial of one con-
spirator determines the guilt of the other conspirator for the pur-
48. 286 Md. 520, 527, 408 A.2d 1317, 1321 (1979).
49. Id
50. Id at 528, 408 A.2d at 1322.
51. Idt at 528-29, 408 A.2d at 1322.
52. People v. Superior Ct., 44 Cal. App. 3d 494, 498, 118 Cal. Rptr. 702, 704 (1975); see, e.g.,
Bartkus v. United States, 21 F.2d 425 (7th Cir. 1927); VanTress v. United States, 292
F. 513 (6th Cir. 1923); Kirkwood v. United States, 256 F. 825 (8th Cir. 1919); People v.
MacMullen, 134 Cal. App. 81, 24 P.2d 794 (1933); Archuleta v. People, 149 Colo. 206, 368
P.2d 422 (1962); People v. Regan, 351 II. App. 550, 115 N.E.2d 817 (1953); State v. Raper,
204 N.C. 503, 168 S.E. 831 (1933). See also Hurwitz v. State, 200 Md. 578, 92 A.2d 575
(1952). But see 28 SOL J. 439 (1884).
53. Such an inconsistency reflects a defect in the functioning of the jury. The jury has either
failed to adhere to the conspiracy requirement that at least two guilty minds must concur,
or it has impermissibly weighed the same evidence differently in regard to each defendant.
People v. Superior Ct., 44 Cal. App. 3d 494, 498, 118 CaL Rptr. 702, 704 (1975).
54. Platt v. State, 143 Neb. 131, 140, 8 N.W.2d 849, 854 (1943). But see United States v.
Espinosa-Cerpa, 630 F.2d 328 (5th Cir. 1980).
55. 286 Md. 520, 528, 408 A.2d 1317, 1322 (1979).
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poses of that trial.56 Therefore, the verdict is inherently consistent
and should not be disturbed.
Those jurisdictions that require consistent verdicts in separate
trials57 view an acquittal as a judicial determination that the ac-
quitted defendant did not participate in the conspiracy.5" The fallacy
of this view is the failure to recognize that one alleged conspirator
may be acquitted for reasons unrelated to his actual guilt or in-
nocence. An acquittal may result from the death or absence of an im-
portant state witness, the inadmissibility of the convicted con-
spirator's confession, the inadmissibility of physical evidence ob-
tained in violation of the acquitted defendant's constitutional
rights, 9 or for any other reason that would result in a failure of
proof.60 Unlike its effect in a joint trial, the acquittal of an alleged
conspirator in a separate trial establishes only that the prosecution
failed to sustain its burden of proof as to that defendant.6' The ac-
quittal does not preclude a determination in the co-conspirator's
trial, based upon a different presentation of evidence, that a con-
spiracy existed.62
The Gardner court's decision, limiting the consistency rule to
joint trials, is also supported by policy considerations. The state has
a strong interest in protecting society and punishing criminals. If
one conspirator is found guilty, striking his conviction merely
because the state failed to sustain its burden of proof in the trial of
his co-conspirator would frustrate the state's interest. With the
Gardner decision, the Court of Appeals of Maryland prevents this
undesirable result.
In light of the inappropriateness of applying the consistency
rule in separate trials, the court's decision to uphold Gardner's con-
viction is well-founded. The evidence presented at Gardner's trial
was sufficient to support the guilty verdict. Thus, there was no
justification for affording him the benefit of the state's failure to sus-
tain its burden of proof in Lubow's trial.6
3
56. Id at 529, 408 A.2d at 1322.
57. E.g., Romontio v. United States, 400 F.2d 618 (10th Cir. 1968), cert dismissed, 402 U.S.
903 (1970); State v. Tom, 13 N.C. (2 Dev.) 371 (1830); Casper v. State, 47 Wis. 535, 2 N.W.
1117 (1879).
58 See, e.g., Farnsworth v. Zerbst, 98 F.2d 541, 544 (5th Cir. 1938).
59. An acquitted defendant's co-conspirators usually lack the requisite standing to object to
the admissibility of such evidence at their own trials. Generally, a defendant may assert
the exclusionary rule only to bar the admission of evidence obtained in violation of his
own constitutional rights. Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165 (1969).
60. Platt v. State, 143 Neb. 131, 143, 8 N.W.2d 849, 855 (1943).
61. Id; see People v. Berkowitz, 50 N.Y.2d 333, 406 N.E.2d 783, 428 N.Y.S.2d 927 (1980).
62. People v. Holzer, 25 CaL App. 3d 456, 460, 102 Cal. Rptr. 11, 13 (1972).
63. See Developments, supra note 18, at 974. One commentator has noted that the practical
effect of applying the consistency rule to separate trials is:
to allow a defendant the benefits of two different trials-his own and that of his
co-conspirator .... Thus the prosecution is imposed with the greatly increased
burden of proving the guilt of a defendant to twenty-four jurors rather than the
normal twelve before the case against either of the defendants may be disposed
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B. The Insanity Defense
The Gardner court did not consider the state's argument that
Lubow's acquittal was not inconsistent with Gardner's conviction
because, even if Lubow was legally insane at the time of the agree-
ment, an illegal meeting of the minds could have occurred.6 4 Con-
sequently, the question remains as to whether one of two alleged con-
spirators can properly be found guilty when his co-conspirator is
found to have been insane at the time of the agreement. 5 This issue
was first considered by the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland in
Regle v. State.
66
In Regle, the court held that one of two alleged conspirators can-
not be convicted when the other is shown to have been insane at the
time of the agreement.67 The court emphasized that it is the con-
federation of at least two criminal intents that is punishable as a con-
spiracy.6 Because an insane person is mentally incapable of forming
a criminal intent, the requisite joint criminal intent is absent and
there can be no punishable conspiracy. 69 In Gardner, the court of
special appeals agreed in dicta 0 with the state's argument that
Regle does not represent a complete and accurate statement of the
law.
71
In a conspiracy prosecution, the theory upon which a conspira-
tor is found to be legally insane is of material significance. Maryland
law provides that an accused may be found legally insane "if he lacks
substantial capacity either to appreciate the criminality of his con-
duct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law."
72
Under the first prong of this test, a defendant escapes criminal
responsibility because he lacks the requisite intent to commit a
of with any degree of finality. Granted, the accused should be given the entire
benefit of any advantage the law may allow in a criminal proceeding, but when
an accused has received a fair trial he seems entitled to no more.
65 W. VA. L. REV. 151, 154 (1963).
64. See Brief for Appellee at 17-23, Gardner v. State, 286 Md. 520, 408 A.2d 1317 (1979).
65. This issue would arise regardless of whether the alleged conspirators were tried jointly or
separately. In either circumstance, the guilt of both conspirators must be established
before either can be convicted of conspiracy. See note 26 and accompanying text supra
66. 9 Md. App 346, 264 A.2d 119 (1970).
67. Id at 355, 264 A.2d at 124.
68. Writing for the court, Chief Judge Murphy stated: "The essence of conspiracy is... a
mental confederation involving at least two persons; the crime is indivisible in the sense
that it requires more than one guilty person; and where the joint intent does not exist, the
basis of the charge of conspiracy is necessarily swept away." Id (citations omitted).
69. Id
70. 41 Md. App. 187, 193-95, 396 A.2d 303, 307-09, affd, 286 Md. 520, 408 A.2d 1317
(1979).
71. Brief for Appellee at 14-16, Gardner v. State, 41 Md. App. 187, 396 A.2d 303 (1979).
72. MD. ANN. CODE art. 59, § 25(a) (1957) (emphasis added). Section 25(a) provides in pertinent
part:
A defendant is not responsible for criminal conduct and shall be found insane at
the time of the commission of the alleged crime if, at the time of such conduct as
a result of mental disorder, he lacks substantial capacity either to appreciate the
criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law.
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crime. 3 Therefore, an alleged conspirator found to have been insane
under this prong would have been incapable of providing his portion
of the joint criminal intent necessary to form a conspiracy. 4 Under
the second prong of Maryland's insanity test, a defendant escapes
punishment, not because he lacks the requisite criminal intent, but
because he is not consciously able to refrain from engaging in the
criminal conduct.75 A conspirator found to have been insane under
the second prong may have had the requisite criminal intent.76
Therefore, his acquittal does not negate the existence of a con-
spiracy 77 and should not bar conviction of the sane co-conspirator.
The holding in Regle, that one who is legally insane is incapable
of forming the intent necessary for conspiracy,7 s is overly broad
because it fails to distinguish between the two prongs under which a
conspirator may be found insane. Furthermore, the holding in Regle
is now inconsistent with the dicta expressed by the court of special
appeals in Gardner that one conspirator's conviction is not neces-
sarily inconsistent with the other conspirator's acquittal by reason
of insanity.79 The court of appeals in Gardner should have addressed
the issue of whether one of two alleged conspirators may be con-
victed when the other is found to have been legally insane at the time
of the agreement. A ruling on this issue would have clarified the law
and provided guidance to the Maryland trial courts. As a result of
the court's failure to do so, final resolution of this question awaits a
future decision by the Court of Appeals of Maryland.
C. Collateral Estoppel-An Alternate Defense
The rationale underlying Gardner 0 applies with equal vigor
regardless of the order in which the defendants are tried. Thus, after
Gardner, the consistency rule will not preclude the conviction of a
conspirator whose sole co-conspirator has been acquitted in an
earlier trial. The Gardner decision, however, is not dispositive of
whether the untried conspirator may raise the defense of collateral
estoppel to bar his prosecution.1
73. Gardner v. State, 41 Md. App. 187, 194-95, 396 A.2d 303, 308, affd4 286 Md. 520, 408
A.2d 1317 (1979).
74. Id But see MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.04(1) (1962). Under the unilateral approach of the
Model Penal Code, see note 26 supra, it is no defense that the person with whom the
defendant conspired was legally insane at the time of the agreement.
75. Conn v. State, 41 Md. App. 238, 244, 396 A.2d 323, 327, rev'd on other grounds, 286 Md.
406, 408 A.2d 700 (1979).
76. Gardner v. State, 41 Md. App. 187, 195, 396 A.2d 303, 308, affd, 286 Md. 520, 408 A.2d
1317 (1979).
77. Id at 194-95, 396 A.2d at 309.
78. 9 Md. App. 346, 355, 264 A.2d 119, 124 (1970).
79. 41 Md. App. 187, 194-95, 396 A.2d 303, 308, afFd, 286 Md. 520, 408 A.2d 1317 (1979).
80. 286 Md. 520, 408 A.2d 1317 (1979). See text accompanying notes 47-50 supra.
81. The court of appeals in Gardner expressly refrained from addressing this issue. 286 Md.
520, 528 n.3, 408 A.2d 1317, 1322 n.3 (1979). Decisions on this precise issue are sparse
because most courts have relied on the consistency rule, rather than collateral estoppel, to
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Generally, when an issue of ultimate fact has been determined
by a final and valid judgment, the defense of collateral estoppel may
be raised to bar relitigation of the issue in a future action between
the same parties."2 Although the doctrine applies to criminal cases,83
there are several reasons why collateral estoppel should not bar the
prosecution of an alleged conspirator when his sole alleged co-
conspirator has been acquitted. First, it will be difficult for the
subsequently tried co-conspirator to satisfy all the required elements
for applying the doctrine. Second, there are policy considerations for
allowing the state to prosecute the remaining conspirator. Finally,
after Gardner, the practical effect of permitting collateral estoppel in
a conspiracy prosecution would be undesirable.
To assert the defense of collateral estoppel, a defendant must
satisfy three elements: the issue sought to be litigated must be iden-
tical to one necessarily decided at a previous trial; the previous trial
must have resulted in a final and valid judgment on the merits; and
the previous trial must have been between the same parties.84 In a
conspiracy prosecution, the first requirement is easily satisfied. The
issue involved in the remaining conspirator's trial-whether a con-
spiracy existed-will be identical to that previously litigated in the
trial of the alleged co-conspirator. The second requirement also will
be easily satisfied. An acquittal that is not based solely on a pre-
liminary or procedural point generally will be a judgment on the
merits.85 Satisfaction of the identity of the parties requirement, how-
ever, would be impossible for an alleged conspirator who is basing
his defense of collateral estoppel on the previous acquittal of his
alleged co-conspirator.
Maryland, 6 along with the majority of other states, 87 has aban-
doned the identity of parties requirement in civil actions. Most
courts have held that a party who had a full and fair opportunity to
bar prosecution of an alleged conspirator whose only co-conspirator has been acquitted.
E.g., State v. Tom, 13 N.C. (2 Dev.) 371 (1830); Commonwealth v. Cambell, 257 Pa. Super.
Ct. 160, 390 A.2d 761 (1978). Collateral estoppel was applied to bar prosecution in People
v. Superior Ct., 44 Cal. App. 3d 494, 118 CaL Rptr. 702 (1975). Accord State v. Bruno, 333
F. Supp. 570, 575 (E.D. Pa. 1971). Contra United States v. Espinosa-Cerpa, 630 F.2d 328
(5th Cir. 1980); People v. Berkowitz, 50 N.Y.2d 333, 406 N.E.2d 783, 428 N.Y.S.2d 927
(1980).
82. See Pat Perusse Realty v. Lingo, 249 Md. 33, 35, 238 A.2d 100, 102 (1968); RESTATEMENT
OF JUDGMENTS § 93 (1942).
83. Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436 (1970); State v. Colbentz, 169 Md. 15, 180 A. 266 (1934).
84. See Cook v. State, 281 Md. 665, 669, 381 A.2d 671, 673 (1978); RESTATEMENT OF JUDG-
MENTS § 93 (1942); Note, Collateral Estoppel in Criminal Prosecutions: Time to Abandon
the Identity of Parties Rule, 46 S. CAL. L. REV. 922, 925 (1973).
85. See Moodhe v. Schenker, 176 Md. 259, 267, 4 A.2d 453 (1939); BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
757 (5th ed. 1979).
86. See MCP, Inc. v. Kenny, 279 Md. 29, 34, 367 A.2d 486, 490 (1977).
87. See, e.g., Bernhard v. Bank of America Nat'l Trust & Sav. Ass'n, 19 CaL 2d 807, 812,,122
P.2d 892, 894 (1942); Ellis v. Crockett, 51 Hawaii 45, 56, 451 P.2d 814, 822 (1969); Home
Owners Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Northwestern Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 354 Mass. 448,
451-55, 238 N.E.2d 55, 57-59 (1968).
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litigate an issue may be estopped from relitigating the issue in a sub-
sequent trial.8 8 Thus, in a civil action, only the party against whom
collateral estoppel is asserted must have been a party to the previous
litigation.89 The primary justification for abandoning the identity of
parties requirement is the need to promote judicial economy by
avoiding repetitious litigation." Generally, the requirement has only
been eliminated in civil actions.91
Abandonment of the identity of parties requirement in criminal
cases 92 would permit an alleged conspirator to raise the defense of
collateral estoppel when his sole alleged co-conspirator has been ac-
quitted in a previous trial. Several reasons exist for allowing the
state to prosecute the untried conspirator. First, the public interest
in the enforcement of the criminal law outweighs any need for judi-
cial economy.93 In addition, there are several factors peculiar to crim-
inal cases that may prevent the state from having a full and fair op-
portunity to litigate in the first trial. One such factor is that the
scope of discovery in criminal cases is limited by court rules and by
the Constitution.94 Therefore, the state's ability to obtain evidence in
support of its case is hindered.95 Constitutional limitations such as
the exclusionary rule may also prevent the state from presenting all
of its proof in a particular case.96 In addition, if a defendant is ac-
quitted and the acquittal is contrary to the weight of the evidence,
the state may not obtain a judgment notwithstanding the verdict97
88. E.g., Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322 (1979); Bernhard v. Bank of America
Nat'l Trust & Sav. Ass'n, 19 Cal. 2d 807, 122 P.2d 892 (1942).
89. E.g., Bernhard v. Bank of America Nat'l Trust & Sav. Ass'n, 19 Cal. 2d 807,812, 122 P.2d
892, 894 (1942); Pat Perusse Realty v. Lingo, 249 Md. 33, 45, 238 A.2d 100, 107 (1968).
Due process of law is satisfied when the party against whom collateral estoppel is
asserted was a party to the previous litigation. Bernhard v. Bank of America Nat'l Trust
& Say. Ass'n, 19 Cal. 2d at 812, 122 P.2d at 894.
90. See, e.g., MPC, Inc. v. Kenny, 279 Md. 29, 34, 367 A.2d 486, 490 (1977).
91. Note, Collateral Estoppel in Criminal Prosecutions: Time to Abandon the Identity of
Parties Rule, 46 S. CAL. L. REV. 922, 941 (1973); see United States v. Standefer, 447 U.S.
10 (1980).
92. Because collateral estoppel is embodied in the fifth amendment guaranty against double
jeopardy, it is constitutionally mandated when there is an identity of parties. Ashe v.
Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 442 (1970). Therefore, when a defendant who has been acquitted of
a crime is subsequently tried on related charges, collateral estoppel precludes relitigation
of issues decided at his first trial. See id at 446-47.
93. In United States v. Standefer, 610 F.2d 1076 (1979), affd, 447 U.S. 10 (1980), the court
stated:
The public interest in the accuracy and justice of criminal results is greater than
the concern for judicial economy professed in civil cases. ... To plead crowded
dockets as an excuse for not trying criminal defendants is in our view neither in
the best interest of the courts, nor the public.
Id at 1093.
94. Standefer v. United States, 447 U.S. 10, 22 (1980); see State v. Collins, 265 Md. 70, 78-79,
288 A.2d 163, 168 (1972); Kardy v. Shook, 237 Md. 524, 537, 207 A.2d 83, 90 (1965).
95. The purpose of discovery is to enable a party to prepare his case by acquiring information
that will support his case and by ascertaining the nature of the evidence his opponent will
present. See Williams v. Moran, 248 Md. 279, 291, 236 A.2d 274, 281 (1967).
96. Standefer v. United States, 447 U.S. 10, 23 (1980).
97. In criminal cases, a judgment notwithstanding the verdict would violate the sixth amend-
ment right to a trial by jury. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
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or a new trial.9" Furthermore, the state, unlike a civil litigant, is
denied the opportunity of appellate review.99 Because of these fac-
tors, the state may not have had a full and fair opportunity to liti-
gate the existence of a conspiracy in the first trial. Therefore, the
state should not be precluded from relitigating the issue at the trial
of the subsequently tried co-conspirator.
Finally, allowing the acquittal of one conspirator to bar the
prosecution of another would be undesirable in light of the Gardner'0
decision. Gardner denies a conspirator the benefit of his co-con-
spirator's acquittal. It is precisely this benefit that collateral estop-
pel would afford a conspirator who is tried second. Therefore, the
availability of collateral estoppel as a defense would encourage co-
conspirators to seek delays in order to be the last brought to trial,
with the hope that the previously tried conspirator will be acquitted.
This type of strategic delay is an abuse of the judicial process and
should be discouraged. Thus, when the issue is presented in Mary-
land, the Court of Appeals of Maryland should deny the defense of
collateral estoppel to an alleged conspirator whose sole alleged co-
conspirator has been previously acquitted.10 1
VI. CONCLUSION
In Gardner v. State, the Court of Appeals of Maryland held that
the rule of conspiratorial consistency does not apply to separate
trials. The court reasoned that a guilty verdict delivered in the trial
of one conspirator also concludes the guilt of the other for purposes
of that trial. Because the verdict is inherently consistent, the con-
sistency rule is inapplicable. The court, however, failed to take ad-
vantage of the opportunity provided by Gardner to clarify whether a
98. A new trial, absent the defendant's consent, would violate the fifth amendment prohibi-
tion against double jeopardy. See United States v. Dintz, 424 U.S. 600 (1976); U.S. CONST.
amend. V.
99. In Kepner v. United States, 195 U.S. 100 (1904), the United States Supreme Court ruled
that the state's appeal of an acquittal violates the fifth amendment prohibition against
double jeopardy. See U.S. CONST. amend V.
The Court of Appeals of Maryland has indicated a hesitancy to preclude a party from
relitigating an issue when that party has not had the benefit of appellate review. In Cook
v. State, 281 Md. 665, 381 A.2d 671 (1978), the court stated:
Considerations of fairness would seem to require that a prior determination of
fact or mixed law and fact should not normally be treated as final, and hence
binding, in a subsequent proceeding against a particular party, where the party
against whom preclusion is sought was denied the opportunity, as a matter of
law, to have the disputed issue decided by an appellate court on direct review.
Id at 675, 381 A.2d at 677. But see id at 676-79, 381 A.2d at 677-79 (Eldridge, J.,
concurring).
100. 286 Md. 520, 408 A.2d 1317 (1979).
101. This would align Maryland with the position recently taken by the Supreme Court. In
Standefer v. United States, 447 U.S. 10 (1980), the Court rejected the application of
collateral estoppel to criminal cases absent an identity of parties and held that the
acquittal of one defendant could not bar relitigation of that defendant's criminal conduct
as an element in the prosecution of the second defendant. Id at 2006-09.
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conspirator may be convicted when his sole alleged co-conspirator is
found to have been insane at the time of the agreement to conspire.
Another important issue remains after Gardner-whether col-
lateral estoppel is available as a defense to an alleged conspirator
whose sole alleged co-conspirator has been previously acquitted. To
successfully assert this defense, an alleged conspirator must first
convince the court to abandon the identity of parties requirement in
criminal cases. Abandonment of this requirement is unwarranted
because the state does not always have a full and fair opportunity to
litigate. Furthermore, after Gardner, the availability of collateral
estoppel would encourage an alleged conspirator to seek delays in
order to be the last brought to trial. Allowing collateral estoppel in
conspiracy cases therefore would result in an abuse of the judicial
process.
Lauren A. Greco
